In 1978, two years after the death of Mao, China made a U-turn to economic reforms, and, with occasional interruptions and reverses, it has been moving on that path.
These reforms have created world-wide attention for a number of reasons of which four figure prominently. First, how does a country with policies based on centralization, fiats, and state ownership and management change to the policies based on decentralization, markets, and private ownership and management? The second reason stems from the sheer size of the country. China's area is 9.6 million sq. metres, forming 7 per cent of the world area and 25 per cent of the area of low income countries. [The World Development Report (1994) defines a low income country as a country whose per capita gross national product was US $ 675 or less in 1992. This usage is followed here.] Its population in 1992 was 1.2 billion, forming 21 per cent of the world population and 36 per cent of the population of the low income countries. Thus, the interesting question here is: how does such a large country change its policies? The third reason relates to the widely acclaimed success of the reforms noticed during the period since the reforms were initiated. Their success is writ large in the statistics of high growth rates of income as such and on a per capita basis, considerable improvements in economic and social well-being of its population, and a large reduction in the proportion of population below the poverty line during the reform period relative to the previous positions on these measures during the earlier period. So the question of interest in this context is: what accounts for this success? Finally, the interest in Chinese reforms relates to a host of other questions having a bearing on the future. Will the reforms continue, and if so at what speed, in what sequence, and in which sectors? What are the tensions which these reforms have brought in their train and how are they being contained? How good would the performance on growth and equity in future be?
This article endeavours to answer some of these questions, and hopefully these answers will meet well, at least to some extent, the queries raised by the aforesaid interests.
A couple of clarifications on the presentation followed here is in order. While dealing with the pre-reform period and the reform period, we confine to the broad trends and developments of each period, and do not refer to the halts and the reverses thereon which have occurred occasionally. Thus, for example, while the prereform period was characterized by a planned and centralized type of development, when it was found that the 'Soviet Model' followed earlier did not work, China switched on to a less centralized 'Chinese Model.' Similarly, while the reform period was characterized by a substantially decentralized and market-driven development, when it was found that this was generating its own problems which could prove harmful in the longrun, corrective action of reversal to centralized and fiatdriven policies was initiated during that limited period as during the late 80s. Secondly, although we have tried our best to give all relevant data for the same years, it has not always been possible to do so as the data on particular items for the same years were not available. In such cases, we have given data for the nearby years to ensure a measure of comparability.
The Pre-reform Period: 1949-78
China of the late 40s was a poor country, devastated by foreign invasions and civil war and ruled by a corrupt administration for long till then. When the communists took over the government in 1949, their immediate task was to bring peace and stability to the country, and to restore a measure of integrity and respect for the government and the party among the populace at large. Their objective, in the long-run, was to build a strong, powerful, and. prosperous country which would be able to hold its head high in the world.
W ith that in view, the government followed a strategy of economic development on a self-reliant, socialist path, avoiding dependence on capitalist countries. The only 4 model that was available then and also regarded as having successfully worked in that country for a long period since 1917 was the 'Soviet Model.' Under this model, the Soviet Union had emerged as a strong and highly industrialized country from its previous position as a poor and largely agricultural country.
Guided on these considerations, China adopted the Soviet Model. Thus, there was only one party -the Communist party-and it was extended in every sphere. For economic growth and development, centralized planning was adopted and resources were allocated to the pre-determined priority sectors by administrative orders. Almost all means of production were nationalized and they were managed either as central/provincial state enterprises or urban/rural collectives. Industrialization, especially heavy industries, was adopted as the kingpin or engine of economic growth.
The country recorded considerable progress under this model for about a decade during which there was not much reservation about its worth or efficacy. But, towards the end of this decade, it was felt that this development had also brought in its train many problems which needed to be attended to. Thus, for example, implantation of foreign institutions, especially the highly centralized system of planning, did not fit well with the Chinese ethos. The search was then set for an alternative which yielded the modified socialist model with considerable decentralization and decontrols that fitted the Chinese socio-economic realities. This model was adopted in 1958 and remained in operation during the remaining pre-reform period of two decades ending 1978.
The pre-reform period of nearly three decades witnessed considerable achievements in several fields, especially in social infrastructure of health and education. Agriculture was developed in terms of the availability and usage of irrigation facilities, fertilizers, and improved seeds. The peasants also acquired management skills. These inputs led to increased agricultural production. But, these gains, when considered on the measures of productivity and per capita output, were limited. Thus, for example, agricultural productivity did not increase and may have declined; and the per capita grain output increased marginally by 12 per cent from 283 kg to 317 kg between 1952-78. The principal reason for this was the presence of fixed pricing and the absence of the link between rewards for effort and punishment for sloth for workers on the farms.
Rapid industrialization with emphasis on heavy industry greatly transformed the Chinese economy in general and its industrial economy in particular during this period. Thus, for example, industry's share in gross Vikalpa f:\QURT-LY\IIM08\Perspect.pm4 domestic product grew from one-fifth in 1952 to one-half in 1978. Nearly three-fifths of the industrial output in 1978 came from the heavy industry sector which was developed with Soviet assistance during the early period. Nearly four-fifths of the industrial output in 1978 came from large and medium enterprises in the public sector.
Reasons for Change
While the rate of growth during the pre-reform period (5-6 per cent per annum) was satisfactory and achievements in social sectors even impressive, why was the need for economic reforms felt, and why were reforms adopted towards marketization and decentralization? We attempt to answer this question in this section, leaving the questions of strategy of reforms and its application to various sectors for the next two sections.
Although economic growth during the early period, as noted above, was satisfactory, it was found slowing down later. Secondly, state protection and support in various ways to, and absence of competition in, economic activities had led to generation and perpetuation of inefficiency -technical, pecuniary, and organizational. As a consequence, the contribution of efficiency to growth was nil or nominal with most of the growth coming from increases in the inputs. It was felt that such a slow growth, poorly aided by productivity increases, was inadequate to build a strong and powerful country which was the central long-term objective of the government.
A third factor relates to the wind of liberalization that had begun affecting almost all countries of the world since the late 70s. Under this set of policies, the countries were increasingly adopting market-friendly, pro-private enterprise policies, and these policies were seen subserving well the objective of efficiency-based growth. It is also possible that the Chinese leaders might have been particularly impressed by the economic progress achieved by the neighbouring countries during the 70s under liberalization. Thus, for example, the average annual growth of gross domestic product of the early liberalizers such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea was 8.3, 9.2, and 9.6 per cent respectively during the 70s and that of even the late liberalizers such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia though lower at 7.1, 7.2, and 7.9 per cent, was higher still than that of China's during the same period. The Chinese leaders might as well have learnt a lesson, namely, one cannot prevent an idea whose time has come, especially when it has proved its worth elsewhere, practically and convincingly.
In 1978, following the death of Mao the supreme leader in 1976, Deng emerged as the unquestioned leader. Speaking generally, an about-turn in policy is easy for a new leader, and becomes easier when, as noted above, . 20, No. 3, July-September 1995 objective conditions in the country suggest diminishing returns to the old policies, and the experiences of other countries on the liberalization route point to the success of alternative policies.
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Underlying Principles
Speaking of reforms, how should reforms be carried out? Gradually or at one-go? On a measure or in a sector? Totally or partially? With how much decentralization? Would they be self-reinforcing with spill-over effects? We attempt to answer these questions in general and also with reference to the Chinese experiments.
Gradual vs. One-go
There is considerable debate on whether reforms should be introduced gradually or at one-go. The literature is silent on how one may demarcate between the gradual and the one-go approach or what is the demarcation point between the two. We may, roughly speaking, suggest that the one-go approach may involve a period of three years or so and the gradual approach up to 20 years or so. Thus, the difference between the two approaches as regards the speed of reforms is not one of kind but of degree. But then, large differences of degree are practically regarded as differences of kind.
It also needs to be clarified that, in practice, gradual reforms are not totally absent under the one-go approach, and that the gradual approach is not devoid of one-go type reforms. To be sure, each would have some component of the other. So one. labels the reality of reforms on the basis of preponderance of each variety.
As to the advantages and drawbacks: Under the gradual approach, society suffers sparingly from severe shocks. Second, the long period permits experiments and trials which yield useful lessons to build further on the reforms, getting confidence from successes, and correcting mid-course mistakes. Third, the success of reforms depends, among other things, upon creating new and strengthening old institutions, replacing new rules and building new conventions, and changing generally the mind-sets of all concerned to meet the new challenges. All this takes time and here again gradualism fares better.
A drawback of this approach is that economic agents are unable to predict the sequence and the speed of reforms and the sectors to which they will be applied. From a government committed to reforms, they may expect that the reforms that would follow may be more favourable than the reforms which are currently in place. So they may postpone their investment and production decisions for that day. Thus, the impact of reforms would be limited during the earlier stages, which in turn may create doubts about the superiority of reforms as a policy instrument. Secondly, reforms affect different groups of people differently -some benefiting and others losing in the process. The losers may unite and form pressure groups to counteract the reform trend, and the larger the number of such groups and their members, the greater their influence and the greater the possibility of slowdown or even the rolling back of reforms.
The one-go approach is marked by a measure of clarity and decisiveness as reforms are completed during a short period. As such, there is little uncertainty as regards commitment of the government, and economic agents see no special advantages in postponing their investment and production decisions. Thus, the impact maybe more visible in the short-run. Secondly, in view of limited time available, the groups and individuals adversely affected by reforms may not be able to unite and exert pressure to slow down or reverse the reforms.
As against this, the one-go reforms may produce turbulence and chaos in economy, society, and polity of the country and leave little time to avoid or to correct the compounded consequences of the initial mistakes and for mid-course corrections. Also, the mind-sets may not change, new institutions may not get established, new rules may not be framed, and new conventions may not be built during the short period. These factors, sooner or later, may lead to the questioning of the worthwhileness of the reforms and of the wisdom of the rulers.
Which of these approaches is superior? What may work in one country may not work in another, and what may work in a country at one time may not work in that country at another. Judging by the performance so far, the one-go approach of the Soviet Union has proved disastrous and the gradual approach of China has proved to be very successful.
Before we move on to the next issue, we would like to remind the reader that while advocating the adoption of laissez-faire during the late 18th century, in place of mercantilist doctrines then in vogue, Adam Smith pleaded for a gradual change. Such a change, he argued, minimized pains of adjustment during the transition.
Partial vs. Total
The second characteristic of the Chinese reforms is that, on a given path, they have been partial, not total. Take, for example, the case of price reforms. Changes from controlled or administered prices for the entire output of commodities to free pricing were partial. Accordingly, a part of the output of a commodity was permitted to be sold at market prices, whereas the other part was to be sold at controlled or administered prices.
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The advantages of dual pricing are three-fold. First, with the output available at controlled prices, some key targets of planning can be met. Second, enterprise managers learn marketing skills while dealing with the other, 'free' output. Third, market prices exert their power in influencing allocation of resources.
A drawback of this system is that there could be leakages from the planned segment to the free segment of output. Total production may be underreported, more of the output may be reported as defective/low quality and other similar devices may be resorted to -all with a view to 'undersell' in the low-price segment, and to 'oversell' in the high-price market. Thus, the dual pricing system has, in a sense, a built-in incentive for corruption.
Decentralization
A third feature of the Chinese reforms has been decentralization of decision-making at provincial, other lower government, and enterprise levels. The enterprise level decentralization was in all sectors -agriculture, manufacture, foreign trade, services, etc.
An advantage of decentralized decision-making is that those who take decisions build a personal stake in their organization. Second, they also learn the various skills relevant in decision-making -weighing pros and cons of alternatives, assessing practical feasibility of their decisions, etc. Third, it also creates interest groups in favour of reforms who may press for continuation and acceleration of reforms.
Three major drawbacks are as follows: First, with decentralized decision-making, central planning becomes weak as the lower levels of government may have their own priorities. These priorities may differ from one lower level of government to another, and also from those of the central government. Second, competition among provincial and local governments to establish their own enterprises in various economic activities may lead to multiplication of suboptimal units, which may not be able to realize fully technological and pecuniary economies of scale. Third, it may also create or aggravate regional imbalances, as some provinces with better resources and better administration may grow faster than others.
Spillover Effects
Chinese reforms have proved to be self-reinforcing and have had spillover effects in the sense that success in one area has released resources for deployment in other areas and created pressures for initiating or accelerating reforms there. Thus, for example, the initial reforms in agriculture which increased agricultural production and productivity created surplus saving and released labour both of which Vikalpa were now available for deployment in industry, particularly in local enterprises in rural areas. The supplies of manufactured goods from these enterprises had a ready market for them thanks to the increased purchasing power of the farmers following agricultural reforms. This, in turn, created pressures for reforms in local industrial enterprises, leading to massive expansion of manufacturing output as in the case of agricultural production. Similarly, decentralization of decisionmaking and adoption of dual pricing of the enterprises of the provincial/lower level governments increased their production and productivity, which in turn created pressures to accelerate reforms there and elsewhere.
Applications
Almost all the major sectors of the Chinese economy have been affected by the economic reforms. It must, however, be added that in view of the gradual nature of reforms, their intensity and spread over time in different sectors have varied. In what follows, we present an outline of the sectoral reforms.
Rural Sector
Of all the reforms, reforms in agriculture and in rural areas have been most significant and most widespread.
Communes were broken-up. Household agriculture was restored with land given on long lease of 15 to 25 years. Instead of surrendering the entire output to the state at fixed prices earlier, the peasants were now permitted to sell a part of their produce at free prices in the market.
The restoration of land to the peasant households increased their stake in work and paved the way for increased production and productivity. A further incentive came from increased agricultural prices which improved profitability of agriculture thanks to the introduction of dual quota-price system. These measures produced spillover effects as elaborated in the previous section.
Decentralization in decision-making at the local government level made these governments more committed to local development programmes, and from this followed the build-up of physical and social infrastructure to support agricultural and industrial development that was already taking place. Finally, the reforms led to the learning of various types of business skill -technical, managerial, financial, marketing, etc.
-among the entrepreneurs, managers, and workers in agriculture and industry, which on application further improved production and productivity.
Foreign Direct Investment
The joint-venture law was passed in 1979, and the first four Special Economic Zones were created in 1980. Since then, foreign direct investment has been flowing in China in a big way -especially from the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand. Thus, the Chinese economy got increasingly integrated with the economies of the neighbouring countries.
Commercial Sector
By 1985, effective privatization of large state-owned commercial and service enterprises had taken place through their sale or lease to, or the establishment of new companies by, the private parties.
State-owned Enterprises
The earlier system of surrendering the entire surplus or profit of state-owned enterprises was being abandoned in favour of sharing the surplus among the central and local governments and the enterprises on a predetermined basis. The other reform relates to the introduction of dual price-quota system under which while state enterprises are enjoined to sell a part of their output at fixed prices set by state directives, they are permitted to sell the other part at free prices in the market, replacing the earlier system of selling their entire output at fixed prices set by state directives. A third major reform in this area relates to the introduction of financial targets in place of output targets for state enterprises.
Financial Sector
This sector witnessed a number of path-breaking reforms. Central banking was separated from commercial banking. To encourage competition, more commercial banks were started. New capital markets were created for secondary trading in government bonds and shares. Also, steps were taken to start non-banking financial institutions.
Fiscal Policy
As cited earlier, there was a system of revenue sharing between the central government, local governments, and enterprises. While this increased the incentive of local governments and the enterprises to improve performance, it also led to squeezing of the revenues of the central government.
Foreign Trade
A number of new foreign trade corporations was created. Provinces were permitted to retain foreign exchange which they could use for imports of raw materials, machines, and technology.
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Social Sector
The social sector has been only marginally affected by reforms. The enterprise level safety network of the prereform period remains more or less intact. However, of late, enterprises are permitted to employ contract labour and restrictions on labour movement have eased a little especially when workers are migrating to high growth areas.
Performance: A Statistical Account
We now describe the achievements of the reform period on various indicators of growth, saving and investment, productivity, structural change, imports-exports, inflation, and economic and social well-being. The relevant data are presented in Tables 1 to 11 .
Growth
The average annual rate of growth of gross national product was 9.1 per cent during 1979-89. The secondary and the tertiary sectors registered high growth relative to the primary sector with 10.5, 11.1, and 5.3 per cent respectively ( Table 1 ).
The year-wise growth rates of gross domestic product for the years 1979 through 1991 are given in Table 2 . The rates varied from 4.5 per cent in 1981 to 14.5 in 1984. In ten of the 13 years, the rate was 7 per cent or more and in 5 more than 10 per cent. This indicates that the high growthrateof7per cent or more was sustained for a large part of the reform period.
Saving and Investment
The high growth is accounted for by high saving and investment and high productivity achieved during the reform period. It will be seen from Table 3 that (Table 3) .
Productivity
Partial and total productivity increased greatly during this period. Incremental output-capital ratio increased from the average of 0.16 during the 60s to 0.25 and 0.26 during the 70s and the 80s. The period 1990-91, however, shows a drastic fall to 0.12. To a large extent, this decline may be due to a low growth rate of 5.6 per cent in 1990 as noted in Table 2 (Table 4) . Table 5 gives the disaggregated data on the contributions of capital, labour, and total factor productivity to the growth of the net material product for the five subperiods of 1955-1991. The national product grew at higher rates continuously from 4.31 per cent during 1955-65 to 6.40 during 1965-78 to 7.98 during 1978-84 to 10.12 during 1984-88 . The years 1988-91 witnessed deceleration to 5.30 per cent.
During the periods of low growth rates, 1955-65 and 1988-91 , the contribution to growth of total factor productivity growth was negative. During the three intermediate periods of high and accelerating growth rates, its contribution increased at higher rates. In the growth rates of 6.40, 7.98, and 10.12 per cent of 1965-78, 1978-84, and 1984-88 , the contribution of total factor productivity was 19,36, and 38 per cent respectively. The contribution of capital during these three periods declined from 24 to 23 to 18 per cent, and of labour it was 57,41, and 45 per cent (Table 5) .
Structural Change
The shares of the primary and the secondary sector in the total output declined from 32 per cent to 28, and from 48 per cent to 45 respectively between 1979-90. The share of the tertiary sector increased correspondingly from 21 per cent to 27 during the same period (Table 6 ).
Imports-Exports
Between 1978-91, the share of imports in gross national product increased from 5.1 per cent to 6.7, and of exports from 4.9 per cent to 10.2. In four of the 14 years, the share of imports was 7 per cent or more and in 11, the share of exports exceeded 7 per cent. All these 11 years are from 1981 to 1991.
The growth rate of imports fluctuated from as low as minus 13 per cent in 1990 to 48.3 in 1985 and of exports from 0.3 per cent in 1983 to 28 in 1979 (Table 7) .
Inflation
The data on inflation as measured by retail prices and cost of living of staff and workers for the period 1979-1991 are given in Table 8 . The table shows generally low inflation rates. Inflation rate on the retail price measure varied from the lowest of 2 per cent in 1979 to the highest of 18.5 in 1988. Similarly, on the cost of living measure, it varied from 1.9 per cent in 1979 to 20.7 in 1988.
In 11 of the 13 years, inflation on the retail price measure was within the single digit limit and in seven years, it was less than 3 per cent. Similarly, on the cost of 8 Vikalpa living measure, it was within the single digit limit in ten years and less than 3 per cent in six years (Table 8) .
Per Capita Income
The per capita income increased at the average annual rate of 5.53 per cent during the 70s and accelerated to 7.62 during the 80s. During 1990-91, however, its growth decelerated to 4.85 per cent. This is explained largely by the low growth rate of gross domestic product of 5.6 per cent in 1990 as noted in Table 2 . These rates compare very favourably with the average annual growth rate of 1.21 per cent of the pre-reform years of the 60s (Table 9) .
Consumption and Poverty Indicators
The reform period is also marked by sharp increases in the levels of consumption, on a per capita basis, of a number of basic necessities and consumer durables. Part A of Table 10 gives statistics on the consumption of basic necessities for the years 1978 and 1988. It will be noticed therefrom that the consumption of pork increased from 7.7 kg. per person to 14.9, an increase of 94 per cent; of poultry from 0. (Table 10 ). Table 11 records progress on some social indicators. The statistics are averages of 60s, 70s, and 80s and of the year 1990-91. We note here the changes with reference to the averages of the 70s which reflect broadly the immediate pre-reform picture and 1990-91, the latest year of the table. Life expectancy increased from 64 to 70; infant mortality declined from 51 to 29; age dependency ratio Vol. 20, No. 3, July-September 1995 declined from 0.76 to 0.49; women's participation in labour force increased from 44.52 to 52.20; and gross enrollment ratio (secondary school) increased from 24 to 41. The data on gross enrollment ratio of females at the primary level for 1990-91 are not available. Their averages for 70s and 80s were 114 and 113. The table also gives the averages of 60s for the first four of the above indicators. Compared to these figures, the figures cited above show still better progress (Table 11) .
Social Indicators
Thus, the performance of the Chinese economy during the reform years has been indeed very impressive. It is marked by a high and sustained growth of gross domestic product on a per capita basis as well as a substantial reduction in the proportions of the poor in the total population, and sizeable and widespread improvements in the levels of economic and social well-being of the Chinese people.
Sustainability
Three questions uppermost in the minds of China watchers are: Will the reforms be rolled back or sustained? If sustained, what will be their nature, areas, sequences, and speed? What are the prospects on investment, productivity, growth, etc. under the alternative assumptions on the speed of reforms? We take up the first question here and the other two questions are focused in the next section. In view of greater uncertainty on developments in the long run, the answers to these questions in that context cannot but be very hazy and less reliable. It is, therefore, best to attempt to answer these questions in the limited context of the short and the medium term of, say, 5 to 7 years. What follows here and in the next section is with reference to that perspective.
The consensus answer on the first question is that the reforms are irreversible and that they will be sustained. This answer is based mainly on the following considerations.
To begin with, the personality problem: If there is any single person who can be credited for initiating reforms in 1978 and sustaining them since then, it is Deng. And although he holds no official position in the government or the party, it is his word or a word on his behalf that matters and makes things move. Deng is at the ripe old age of 90, and is reported to be critically ill for quite some time. The question in this context is: Will the reforms survive the great reformer? It is difficult to answer this question. But, one may argue that Deng may have appointed his own trusted persons, and through them others with conviction in reforms, in government, party, bureaucracy, services, and enterprises at various levels. These people may be expected to carry on Deng's legacy of reforms even when the umbrella of Deng is not available to shield them. Thus, for example, it is reported that Deng has already named Jiang Zemin as his successor, Lia Peng as Prime Minister, and Zhu Rongii as Vice-Premier. It is further reported that his successordesignate has emerged as the most important leader acceptable to major groups in the Chinese polityideologues, military, provincial administration, and technocrats.
Secondly, policies regarding restoration of peasant household cultivation, partial free marketization, decentralization in decision-making, etc. have increased the stake of owners/managers/workers in their enterprises, and have benefited these groups materially. Thus, the reforms have created and are nurturing a fairly large constituency of persons at different levels which may be expected to support the on-going reforms.
Thirdly, within a period of over a decade, reforms have proved their worth. As documented in the previous section, the reform period has witnessed a high and sustained rate of economic growth as such and on a per capita basis, substantial reduction in the proportion of the poor people, and sizeable and widespread improvements in the levels of economic and social wellbeing of the Chinese people.
Finally, an awkard question. How compatible are these reforms of the 'Communist' government with the ideology of Communism? To be sure, a number of elements of the Communist ideology have vanished or have been marginalized under the reforms. Thus, for example, some of the centralized decision-making has yielded to decentralized decision-making at various levels -at the provincial, local government, and enterprise levels. Some of the directed pricing and allocation of products and services have given way to market-driven pricing and allocation. The closed economy has opened out for trade and investment, and is increasingly integrating with the world economy. While sloth or failure related penalties are rare, effort and success related incentives are already in place at the enterprise/ firm levels.
All the same, it must be remembered that a number of ideological elements of Communism are yet very much there. These are: Monopoly of the Communist party in politics, state ownership of means of production in large extractive/manufacturing/finance sectors, limited freedom of movement of labour, etc.
Seen together, these points suggest that the Communist government has come to terms with the reality of co-existence or co-habitation in practice of the elements of the capitalist and the Communist ideologies. Further, inasmuch as the economic and social progress registered in China under the reforms is attributed to the practice of capitalist-type reforms, it may be expected that reforms will be sustained and may even be accelerated. However, inasmuch as the label of Communism has still an emotional appeal, the government and the party will continue to be called Communist, and may retain, for at least some time to come, some elements of that ideology in practice in certain areas. But in other areas where the sensitivity to change is less and where the economic benefits of change are expected to be substantial, the government will continue to move forward to reforms -extensively and intensively. Thus, for some time to come, the government will continue with and may even strengthen the on-going capitalist-type reforms.
This optimism follows not merely from the achievements of reforms but also from the possible general awareness among the higher-ups in China that the country has yet a long way to go to be strong and prosperous, and for this, they will have to be on the path of reforms for quite some time to come.
More on the Prospects
From the conclusion of the previous section that reforms will be sustained follows the second question or rather a series of questions. What will be the nature of reforms, to which areas will they now be extended, and what will be their sequence and speed?
As compared to the first question, this set of questions is more specific, and in view of limited knowledge, more difficult to answer. Further, while there is a broad measure of agreement on the areas in which reforms will not be initiated or if initiated not accelerated, there is precious little that one can say positively on the other parts of the question regarding the areas that will be taken up for reforms, their sequence, and speed.
In what follows, we, therefore, give a broad outline of the areas which are not likely to be touched by reforms and the areas and measures which may be taken up for reforms. We leave off completely the question of sequence. Finally, as regards speed, all we do is to present scenarios of growth, saving, investment, productivity, etc. under alternative assumptions of slow, moderate, and rapid acceleration of reforms relative to the present position on the on-going reforms.
Exclusions
It was noted in the previous section that the government may not introduce reforms in the areas of high sensitivity to one or the other elements of the Communist ideology. For instance, state ownership of means of production is basic to Communism. On this consideration, privatization of large enterprises in manufacturing, infrastructure, finance, etc. is ruled out. The other element of this ideology is central planning. To meet certain plan targets, especially in critical areas, the government will continue to pre-empt a part of the output of goods and services produced by critical sectors such as power, steel, credit, etc. at fixed prices to fulfil plan targets. On nationalist and patriotic considerations, government may continue its controls on the external sector in the areas of exportsimports, foreign investment, and exchange-rate. To subserve the social objective, a core element of the Communist ideology, and also to contain political and social tensions to enable it to go ahead with reforms smoothly, if gradually, it would be wary of introducing exit policy, implementing bankruptcies, or removing the social safety net provided by the enterprises.
Extensions
The Chinese immediate reform plan issued recently includes: "a programme to expand the number of enterprise groups to 100 from the present 57, with groups which cross ministerial, bureau or even provincial boundaries, and be the locus of many other reform initiatives, such as the formation of joint-stock companies; a renewed emphasis on price reform and a clear commitment to eliminate major distortions, even if not necessarily via markets; a new focus on reform of the distribution system, and on the formation of an integrated national market; a major initiative on social sector reforms, especially housing, social security and unemployment and medical insurance; and further reforms of the investment type" (World Bank Publication on China, 1992).
It is not clear how these reforms will be operationalized. Also, beyond these reforms, at some time or the other, the government has to address itself to a number of other issues such as those listed above under the head exclusions, as also those related to ensuring macro-economic stability, codification of the legal status of the enterprises, easing restrictions on labour mobility, improving industrial relations system, strengthening infrastructure, etc.
Speed of Reforms
The most difficult question on the prospects relates to the speed of reforms. It seems nobody has a clear and reliable answer to it. However, based on different assumptions on the speed of reforms, the World Bank (World Bank Publication on China, 1992) has presented three economic scenarios under the assumptions of slow, moderate, and rapid acceleration of reforms. The first case assumes slow-down of reforms as per the experience of reform cycles of the 1980s. The second case assumes a moderate, steady pace of reforms over the decade. The third case assumes that the pace of reforms quickens in the next year or so. Table 12 gives the numbers of 13 key macroeconomic indicators under these three scenarios for the years 1993,1995,1997, and 2000 . We present below in a tabulated form the statistics on six of these items for the year 2000. To highlight the main points: (1) GDP growth is higher under the rapid reform case than under the other two cases. (2) Total consumption growth, capital efficiency (indicated by incremental capital-output ratio),and export growth increase with acceleration of reforms.
(3) Investment relative to GDP decreases with acceleration of-reforms. (4) Inflation is lower in moderate and rapid reform cases than in the slow reform case (Table 12 ).To summarize: The scenarios point to higher economic stability, higher growth of GDP and of total consumption, lower investment and higher productivity of capital with greater speed of economic reforms.
In conclusion, we refer to some major problems which the Chinese are facing. The decentralization of banking and finance and mounting deficits of public sector enterprises have weakened the Central Government, and it has been compelled to resort to heavy deficit financing leading occasionally to high inflation. Secondly, partial reforms in pricing of products and allocation of output have led to increased corruption at various levels, and conspicuous consumption by those who have benefited from such ill-gotten incomes and wealth. Thirdly, physical infrastructure -roads, railways, power, communication -is notoriously bad, inadequate, not dependable, and of poor quality. Fourthly, the laws and the rules governing political, civic, and commercial fields and their implementation leave much to be desired from the points of view of uniformity, transparency, and fairness. These and several other areas need to be attended to expeditiously in order to maintain and enhance the thrust of reforms for further gains in growth and welfare in China. . 20, No. 3, July-September 1995 
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